Across Protocol: A Hijacked Web Address Sent Visitors to a Fake Site That Drained About $350K
Attackers talked their way into Across's domain account and pointed across.to at a wallet-draining copy. GoPlus puts losses near $350,000.
Key numbers
~$350K
Lost (GoPlus estimate)
15 minutes
Time to first alert
6
Chains hit
None, says Across
Contracts affected
At about 18:45 UTC on Tuesday 10 November 2026, someone persuaded a domain company to hand over control of a web address. The address was across.to, the front door of Across Protocol, a service that moves crypto from one blockchain to another. Within 15 minutes Across's team had been alerted. For some of the visitors who arrived in that window, it was already too late.
Across says a social engineering attack on its domain registrar, Namecheap, gave a bad actor control of the domain. Social engineering means tricking a person rather than breaking a machine: a convincing story told to a support agent, not a line of hacking code. The attacker then pointed the address at a copy of the Across site built to empty wallets. GoPlus Security, a firm that tracks wallet-draining attacks, estimated total user losses at $350,000. Across has not confirmed that figure.
The post office comparison
A domain name works like a shop's street address, and a registrar works like the post office that keeps the official record of which building that address belongs to. Namecheap is a large domain registrar: it rents out names such as across.to and stores the instructions that tell the internet where each name leads. Those instructions are the DNS records, the internet's address book.
Picture someone phoning the post office, posing as the shop owner and giving a believable reason to change the address on file. Every customer who then follows the shop's official address ends up at a lookalike shop down the road, with the same sign and the same shelves, run by a thief. The real shop is untouched and its stock is safe. The customers are the ones robbed. That is a domain hijack, and it is what Across describes.
What the fake site did
Across Protocol is a bridge. A bridge in crypto works like a currency exchange kiosk at a border: money goes in on one blockchain, and the same value comes out on another. People use it through a website, called the front end, where they connect their wallet and approve a transfer. The smart contracts, the code that actually moves the money by itself, sit on the blockchains. Across says its contracts were not affected, and the attacker did not need them. The weak point was the website.
GoPlus said the fake page lured visitors into signing approvals. Three kinds were named. One is an EIP-2612 permit, a signed note that lets another party move a token without a separate transaction. A second is a Permit2 authorisation, a similar permission handled through a shared contract. The third is an ordinary token approval. Each works like signing a blank cheque: the visitor believes they are authorising one bridge transfer and in fact gives the attacker the right to take their tokens. In some cases, GoPlus said, users may also have been tricked into sending funds straight to the attacker.
According to GoPlus, money left wallets on Ethereum, Arbitrum, Base, BNB Chain, Ink and Plasma. It listed eight addresses used by the attacker to collect the approvals and four that Across identified as receiving the stolen funds. The number of victims has not been published, and neither has a loss figure from Across itself.
The response
Across says it was alerted within 15 minutes and moved to shut the site down. SEAL911, an emergency network of security volunteers, marked across.to as a phishing site with major wallet makers, so wallets would show a warning. Cloudflare, the company that handles much of the web's traffic routing, marked the domain as at risk and later removed its DNS records, which took the fake site offline.
Across's first public statement came at 22:13 UTC and carried a pointed complaint. It said Namecheap had been unresponsive and that Across could not properly secure the domain to bring its own services back up, so its website and its API, the technical connection other programs use, would stay down. It also said the domain had been locked down with best-in-class security practices and that the takeover should not have been possible. It said no third-party integrations or API users were affected, and that anyone who believed they were hit should message Across with transaction details and cancel the attacker's permissions.
At 01:16 UTC on 11 November, about six and a half hours after the hijack began, Across said it had control of the domain again and all systems were working. It thanked Namecheap's founder, Richard Kirkendall, for replying on X, helping secure the account and opening an investigation into how the hijack happened. No separate Namecheap statement on the incident was found in the sources reviewed for this article. No source cited here accuses Namecheap of wrongdoing. Across's complaint concerned how slowly it got help, and its later thanks concerned the help it got.
Who pays
Across wrote that all affected users will be made whole, and promised a full post-mortem in the coming days. No total, method or deadline for repayment has been given. Users were told to cancel old permissions using a tool such as Revoke.cash and to move funds they were worried about. Cancelling a permission stops future theft but does not reverse a transfer that has already happened, and some signatures collected off-chain may still be usable, according to crypto.news. A warning in a wallet or browser may linger on across.to for a while, Across said, and it should clear soon.
Not the first time
The post-mortem will have to answer the question Across itself raised: how a domain account it calls locked down was opened by a trick. Until then, the cause rests on Across's own account and on GoPlus's reading of it.
Registrars have been the weak point before. On 31 October, the addresses of 12 other crypto sites, including Kintsu and Flap, were pointed at a theft kit, and their registrar, Name.com, later said 15 of its customers' domains were hit. Curve Finance lost its curve.fi address through its registrar in 2022 and again in 2025. The pattern is the same each time: the contracts and audits are fine, and the damage comes through the one part of the system a company rents from someone else.
Across has also had trouble this year. In July, according to crypto.news, an attack on a Solana relayer run by Risk Labs, the company behind Across, ended with a net loss of under $4 million. That incident was separate from this one.
The wider picture is grim. DefiLlama counted $8.78 billion lost across 341 hacks and exploits so far in 2026, led by a $6.36 billion breach at Binance, according to The Block. At about $350,000, Across is a small entry on that list.
The aftermath
Across says it has regained across.to, that all systems are working and that every affected user will be made whole. It has promised a full post-mortem, which should show how an attacker got past Namecheap's checks. As of 12 November no repayment amount, victim count or confirmed loss figure has been published, and nobody has been identified as the attacker. Namecheap has opened an investigation, according to Across. Wallet warnings on the domain may linger for a while.
What this teaches
- A protocol can have sound code and still lose users through its website address. The registrar is part of the security perimeter.
- Hours matter. Across says it was alerted within 15 minutes, yet its website and API stayed down until the domain was recovered about six and a half hours after the hijack began.
- A permission signed on a fake page works like a blank cheque. Cancelling it afterwards stops new theft, not theft already done.
