Hack Database

K3 Capital, Gonka and Reental: Three DeFi Thefts in One Day Took About $5.4M

On 18 November 2026 a savings vault, an AI network's bridge and a property lender were all drained. Only Reental got back its property tokens.

K3 Capital, Gonka and Reental: Three DeFi Thefts in One Day Took About $5.4MLogos: K3 Capital, Gonka, Reental
K3 Capital, Gonka and Reental were all drained on 18 November.

Key numbers

  • $3.43M

    K3 Capital, Ethereum

  • $1.05M

    Gonka bridge, Ethereum

  • up to $955K

    Reental, Polygon

  • $49.34M

    Property tokens clawed back

Three separate decentralised finance projects were drained on Wednesday 18 November 2026. DeFi means lending, saving and trading run by software instead of by a bank or broker. The three cases were unrelated, with different flaws on different blockchains. Together the first reports put the losses at roughly $5.4 million: about $3.43 million at K3 Capital, about $1.05 million at the Gonka bridge and up to $955,000 at Reental. None of the three had published a full explanation in the sources used here.

K3 Capital: a vault that mispriced its own shares

K3 Capital runs sBOLD, a vault on Ethereum built on Liquity V2. A vault works like a fund. Savers hand over a digital dollar called BOLD and receive shares, and the vault puts the money to work to earn a return. When a saver leaves, the shares are swapped back for BOLD at the current share price. If the share price is wrong, someone can buy shares cheap and cash them in dear.

That is what the data firm Bitquery says happened. The vault's share price ignored certain assets sitting inside it. According to Bitquery, the attacker borrowed 10,000 wstETH, a version of the coin Ether, for a few seconds in a flash loan, a loan that must be repaid inside the same transaction. It used the money to create about 9 million BOLD. Each round, the attacker put BOLD in for shares, sent a different coin, WETH, straight into the vault where the price formula did not count it, then used the vault's swap feature to turn that WETH into BOLD the formula did count. Cashing in the shares at the inflated price pulled out BOLD that belonged to other savers. Bitquery says each transaction repeated this about eight times.

SlowMist described the same weakness. The accounts differ on details: Blockaid's first alert said the attacker flash-loaned wstETH, self-liquidated a Liquity loan position and counted about 34 transactions. Bitquery says no position was liquidated and counted 97 transactions from six wallets between 12:25 and 12:33 UTC. Both put the loss near $3.4 million, and Bitquery says the vault lost its entire balance.

The money was not all the original attacker's. Bitquery found that a bot copied the attack and took about $1.91 million, 56 percent of the total. The attacker and one wallet it funded took about $520,000 and sent it on through THORChain and Maya Protocol, services that swap coins between blockchains. No person has been named.

K3 posted on X at 13:08 UTC: "We are investigating malicious activity involving sBOLD. Contracts have been paused." The Defiant noted that the announcement gave no reopening date and no promise to compensate savers.

Gonka: a bridge whose signing key was swapped

Gonka is a network where people sell computing power for artificial intelligence work. Its coin, GNK, lives on its own blockchain. A bridge lets a coin travel to another blockchain, here Ethereum. The usual design locks the original coin and issues a stand-in, called WGNK, on the other side. Think of a cloakroom: you hand in a coat and get a ticket, and the ticket is worth a coat only while the coat stays behind the counter.

A bridge needs a way to know a withdrawal is real. Gonka's uses a group signing key, a BLS key, which stands for the combined approval of the network's validators, the computers that run it. The key changes every period, called an epoch, and the bridge checks signatures against the current one.

Blockaid said at 18:28 UTC that an attacker "rotated the Ethereum bridge's epoch BLS group key" and used it to empty the remaining stablecoin reserves and mint unbacked WGNK. Stablecoins are digital dollars. The attacker had made the bridge accept a new master key, so the bridge believed forged approvals. Blockaid counted about $1.05 million realised across about five transactions and said the attack was still going. U.Today, citing the tracker Onchain Lens, reported $884,800 in USDT and USDC withdrawn and about $172,000 of unbacked WGNK created, with funds passing through Uniswap and several wallets. How the attacker gained the right to rotate the key has not been explained in the sources read.

Gonka posted a statement at 00:18 UTC on 19 November. It said the incident "was detected within minutes", that "several promising leads have been identified", and that the community would work with law enforcement, exchanges and analytics partners. It gave the attacker 12 hours to "return 100% of all assets taken" and listed return addresses. The sources read do not report that anything was returned.

Reental: an admin changed the rules

Reental tokenises real estate, selling digital tokens that each stand for a share of a property. Its lending service, RNT Lend on Polygon, lets people deposit dollar coins to earn interest and lets others borrow against property tokens.

Each lending market was run by a program that could be replaced. That is an upgrade: the holder of an admin key, the master key, can swap the code behind the market for new code. Normally this fixes bugs. In the wrong hands it rewrites the rules. Bitquery found that at 11:41 UTC on 18 November the admin key swapped the code behind the two dollar markets for code that sent the coins to any address that asked, with no check on who was asking.

Two MEV bots, programs that hunt for profitable transactions and pay extra fees to go first, took the pools' cash within seconds: $454,825, which matches Blockaid's first alert. Bitquery says the key's holder then took about $499,877 more from 1,149 user wallets created by Reental's wallet system and from four Safes, shared wallets that had given a Reental contract standing permission. That brings stablecoins out to $954,703.

Bitquery stresses that the blockchain shows only that one key signed every step. It cannot show whether the key was stolen or misused by someone inside, so neither theft nor insider action should be assumed. The key had been the pool's admin since May 2023, became a MetaMask smart account on 25 September, and was unused from 5 November until the attack.

The same key also swapped code on 89 property markets and moved five token types out of Reental's own Safe, about $49.34 million at Reental's own prices. Bitquery says Reental's other Safe owners pulled all of it back within about two hours. The stablecoins were not recovered. At 16:17 UTC the dollar markets still ran the broken code, and Bitquery advised sending nothing to them. Reental had made no public comment when Bitquery published.

The aftermath

By the time of the sources read, no project had named an attacker, announced a repayment plan or published a post-mortem. K3 Capital's contracts were paused and Bitquery found the vault empty. Gonka set a 12-hour deadline for returns that ran out on the morning of 19 November, and no return has been reported. Reental recovered its property tokens but not its stablecoins, and its dollar markets were still running broken code at the last check.

What this teaches

  • A vault must price its shares from everything it holds, or a coin it ignores can be used to inflate the share price.
  • A bridge is only as safe as the key that approves withdrawals, so any way to rotate that key is a prime target.
  • An admin key that can swap a market's code can drain it. Spreading that power over several people lowers the risk, and Reental's other Safe owners did undo part of the damage.
  • Early alerts are often wrong on detail: Blockaid's first K3 report differed from Bitquery's later trace on both method and transaction count.