Optimizely: Hacked Scripts Turned 178 Brands' Websites, From CNN to the BBC, Into Crypto Traps
Optimizely's servers delivered code that swaps crypto addresses and copies card numbers to the websites of 178 organisations, including CNN and the BBC.

Key numbers
$7,040
Crypto taken by 19:25 UTC, 16 Nov
178
Organisations (Helme)
188
Infected files (Helme)
186
Sites infected (StepSecurity)
On 16 November 2026, people reading the BBC, visiting Zoom's website or checking the news on CNN were handed a small piece of extra code that none of those companies had written. It came from the servers of Optimizely, a software company that large websites pay to test new designs on their visitors. The code was built to steal. It swapped crypto wallet addresses, copied card numbers and, according to one researcher, tried to break into older iPhones.
Scott Helme, a security researcher who runs Report URI, a service that watches what code runs on websites, checked 1,611 Optimizely code files that day. He found the malicious code in 188 of them, belonging to 178 organisations. "The real number is likely higher," he wrote, because he could only check the files he found in time. By 19:25 UTC the attackers' crypto wallets had received about $7,040. A researcher writing as Amirul Cyber named the campaign OPTIMJACK.
The counts in circulation differ, and the reason is timing. Helme's first sweep, between 19:24 and 19:59 UTC, found 186 infected files. His final tally was 188 files, and because some organisations had more than one, that came to 178 organisations. StepSecurity, a security firm that published its own analysis on 17 November, reported "186 infected sites and 188 infected script files", crediting both figures to Helme, and many news reports repeated 186 as a count of websites.
According to Helme's published list, the 178 include Zoom, the BBC, CNN, Fox News, Salesforce, GitLab, American Eagle, Hootsuite, IKEA, HSBC, Equifax, Air France-KLM, Peacock and Ledger, the maker of crypto hardware wallets. StepSecurity found the payload itself in public scans of 17 sites, including CNN, Fox News, Hootsuite and American Eagle. These companies did not attack anyone. They were customers of a supplier, and the supplier's files were tampered with.
A testing tool turned into a delivery van
A/B testing is the website version of a shop trying two window displays to see which one sells more. Optimizely runs these experiments by giving each customer a small code file, a "snippet", which the customer's website loads from Optimizely's own servers at cdn.optimizely.com. Whoever controls that file controls what runs in every visitor's browser.
The attackers wrote one extra line into a box in each customer's Optimizely account where custom code can go. That line fetched a script called track.js from a website named 1688360.cc, registered at 05:23 UTC that same morning. Helme stressed that Optimizely's delivery network "served exactly what it was given": the files were changed at the source. At 01:02 UTC on 17 November, Optimizely's status page said "an unauthorized party exploited a vulnerability in Experimentation" to add the code to "some customer projects".
This is a supply-chain attack, the computing equivalent of poisoning a wholesaler's stock so that every shop it supplies sells the poison under its own name.
How the address swap worked
A crypto wallet address works like a bank account number: a long string of letters and digits that nobody types by hand, so people copy and paste it. The script, a so-called clipper, hunted for addresses on eight networks: Bitcoin, Ethereum, TRON, Solana, TON, Litecoin, Bitcoin Cash and Dogecoin. It replaced each one with the attackers' own. It only swapped addresses that passed the network's built-in error check, similar to the check digit on a bank card, so the replacement looked valid and a wallet app would accept it.
StepSecurity found it acted only when nearby text contained a payment word such as "wallet", "deposit" or "send". It rewrote addresses in the page text, in form boxes and in the clipboard, so an address could be swapped between the copy and the paste. After a swap it photographed the page and sent that picture, plus up to 8,000 characters of the visitor's cookies, the small files that keep people logged in, back to the attackers.
At 13:43 UTC, according to Helme, a card skimmer was added. It grabbed card numbers, expiry dates and security codes typed into a site's own forms. It could not read the separate payment boxes supplied by firms such as Stripe and Adyen.
For iPhones and iPads, Helme says the code loaded known hacking kits: one called Coruna for iOS 13 to 17 and one called DarkSword for iOS 18. Apple's iOS 18.7.3 and 26.3 are patched, according to the kit's own notes, and on older versions affected pages reloaded every 60 seconds to retry. StepSecurity did not retrieve those files and says it cannot confirm which attack runs.
The money
Helme published the wallets and what each had received by 19:25 UTC. The bitcoin address, 19g9rZcPeiz8rUvyWpTRyXXhPnjsWrc3kW, took the most: 0.08298 bitcoin (about $5,380). The rest was 17.02 litecoin ($762), 662.9 USDT, a digital dollar issued by Tether, plus 184 TRX on TRON ($719), 0.055 ether ($100) and 82 USDT on BNB Chain ($82). The total was about $7,040. StepSecurity checked the same addresses on public blockchain records and put the haul at about $6,600 at 16 November prices, with four of the eight wallets never used.
The attackers moved funds out between 13:03 and 13:05 UTC, part of it to a deposit address at HitBTC, a crypto exchange, which works like an online broker. The TRON wallet had been in use since March 2026, so the operator was not new. Nobody knows how many cards, cookies or phones were taken. None of that shows up on a blockchain.
Found, cleaned, unexplained
Helme's timeline puts the first tampering at 04:21 UTC, in the BBC's snippet. A mass clean-up ran from about 20:40 to 21:10 UTC: Ledger at 20:41, the BBC at 21:07. StepSecurity reports that at about 21:32 Helme still counted 41 of the 188 files infected. Helme's own write-up says that by 21:52 only one, TalkTalk's, was left. On 17 November the site BreachHistory fetched twelve named files and found the code in none of them.
Optimizely spoke only after the clean-up. Its status page note says it has "fixed the vulnerability", removed the code and secured affected user accounts. Before that, Helme says, his team had "not had any response". A separate breach in February 2026, when phone scammers reached some internal systems, has not been linked to this one.
For anyone who sent crypto on these sites on 16 November, Helme's advice is short: check the transfer, because a pasted address that does not match the intended one may have been swapped. StepSecurity adds that the check should be made on the wallet or hardware-wallet screen against the address intended, not against what was copied.
The aftermath
By the night of 16 November almost every infected file had been cleaned, according to Helme, and early on 17 November Optimizely said it had fixed the flaw that let the attackers in. It has not said what that flaw was or how long it was open, and nobody has named who is behind the campaign. Helme notes the same operator had used an earlier tool against Turkish websites in September and an iPhone loader identical to one he analysed in October.
The defence that worked was a website setting called a Content Security Policy, a guest list that tells the browser which outside sites may run code or receive data. Report URI found that 24 of the affected organisations it tested blocked the payload outright. Most had no such list, or one that let the attackers through.
The cash total is small: about $7,040 in crypto by Helme's count. The unknown part is larger. Card numbers, login cookies and any iPhones broken into leave no public record, and the people affected may not find out for weeks.
What this teaches
- A trusted supplier's code runs with the same power as the website's own code. One compromised supplier reached 178 organisations in a day.
- Copying a crypto address is not proof it arrived intact. Check the address on the wallet or hardware-wallet screen against the one intended.
- Payment boxes hosted by a payment firm in a separate frame kept card details out of the skimmer's reach.
- Keeping iPhones and iPads updated closed the door the exploit kits were trying to open.