Court Watch

MEXC: US Treasury Orders American Banks to Cut It Off, Citing $16.7B in Flows

A US Treasury unit says $16.7B in illicit flows crossed MEXC and is barring US firms from transfers with it. MEXC is reviewing it. No court has ruled.

MEXC, and the US Treasury, whose FinCEN office issued the order.

Key numbers

  • $16.7B

    Flows called illicit

  • May 2021 to May 2026

    Period FinCEN measured

  • 30 days after publication

    Takes effect

  • None

    Court ruling

On Friday 6 November 2026 an office of the US Treasury told American banks and payment firms that they will soon have to stop moving money to or from MEXC, one of the 20 biggest crypto exchanges in the world. A crypto exchange is a broker for digital coins. The office is the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), which sets the anti-money-laundering rules for US financial firms. Its order comes down to one line: "A covered financial institution is prohibited from engaging in any transmittal of funds from or to MEXC Global."

FinCEN's reason is a number. It says that between May 2021 and May 2026 MEXC "facilitated the movement of USD 16.7 billion in funds connected to Russian illicit finance and other illicit activities, including sanctions evasion and cybercrime." The Treasury's press release rounds this to "at least $16 billion". The figure is FinCEN's own finding about money that flowed across the exchange. It is not money MEXC is said to have kept, it is not a sum stolen from customers, and no court has tested it.

MEXC answered on X just after midnight UTC on 7 November. It said it was "operating normally" and that user assets "remain secure".

What the order is, and what it is not

This is not a sanction. Sanctions are the job of a different Treasury office, the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), and the order says only that existing OFAC rules still apply. It contains no instruction to block or seize MEXC's assets.

It is not a criminal charge or a conviction either. FinCEN "finds that reasonable grounds exist for concluding" that MEXC is "of primary money laundering concern in connection with Russian illicit finance". That is an agency's judgement, based on public and non-public information, including its analysis of blockchain records, the public ledgers of crypto transfers. No judge has heard it. Civil or criminal penalties do appear in the order, but they apply to a US institution, and its officers and staff, for "willfully violating" the ban.

The law is section 9714(a) of the Combating Russian Money Laundering Act, which FinCEN has used before, against the exchanges Bitzlato (January 2023) and PM2BTC (2024). The ban covers the institutions listed in US Bank Secrecy Act rules: banks, securities brokers, mutual funds and money services businesses, a group the order says includes firms that move crypto. "Funds" means dollars and crypto alike. The target is MEXC outside America, including MX Global Ltd in Seychelles, MEXC Estonia, GIDA Technology AG in Switzerland and MXC Global Ltd in Britain. Any MEXC offices in the United States are expressly left out.

The ban is not yet in force. The order leaves the date blank, to be filled in as 30 days after publication in the Federal Register, "with no cessation date." The Federal Register is the US government's official journal. A check of its website at 05:43 UTC on 7 November found no MEXC order, either published or on its public inspection list, so the 30 days had not begun, and the ban cannot start before December. The pre-publication copy warns that the final text may vary slightly. FinCEN also keeps the power to set conditions or grant exemptions, and invites MEXC and others to send it relevant information.

What FinCEN says moved through MEXC

FinCEN describes MEXC as founded in 2018, incorporated in Seychelles and working across more than 170 countries. It says that as of June 2026 the exchange handled more than $1 billion a day and held about $5 billion in reserves. The Treasury's release dates those two figures to September.

The order does not add up its $16.7 billion line by line, and its categories can overlap.

Russia comes first, because the law used is about Russia. FinCEN says MEXC sent or received nearly $1.5 billion in "direct and indirect exposure" to transactions linked to Russian sanctions evasion, including $232 million directly with entities sanctioned by the US, the EU or Britain. It says that after sanctions were imposed, MEXC handled about $129 million with Garantex, a Russian exchange, and $4.1 million with its successor Grinex, and that this continued "as recently as June 2026".

FinCEN also points to at least $26 million benefiting the A7 Network, which it describes as a self-styled sanctions-resistant payments provider based in Russia, and almost $200 million connected to A7A5, a stablecoin (a digital coin pegged to a currency, here the rouble).

The biggest single claim covers a different period. FinCEN says that from May 2018 to July 2026 MEXC handled more than $13 billion with at least four exchanges sanctioned by Britain. It counts a further $2.9 billion or so with exchanges that allegedly do not check customers' identity.

The Iran numbers

Reports have quoted both about $1 billion and about $22 million for Iran. Both come from the order, and they measure different things. FinCEN says nearly $2 billion was connected to Iranian actors or known or suspected terrorist groups. Of that, about $1.87 billion was transactions "with exposure to Iran". Over $1 billion of the $1.87 billion was direct dealing with more than 40 Iranian crypto exchanges. About $22 million was associated with Iran's central bank and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and its Quds Force. FinCEN separately counts about $36 million linked to Hamas's Al-Qassam Brigades and other Iran-linked groups.

The legal finding is about Russia. The public message was about Iran. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent said: "Financial institutions cannot have it both ways: Either you support the Iranian regime, or you have access to the U.S. financial system."

On North Korea, FinCEN says MEXC helped sanctioned launderer Sim Hyon Sop receive about $350,000 between June and September 2025. On cybercrime, it counts at least $1.99 billion from or to illicit cyber actors, including more than $37.9 million in suspected ransomware payments, the money paid to criminals who lock up computer systems.

FinCEN's wider complaint is about controls. It says MEXC's rules bar certain countries "on paper" while the exchange still dealt with them, sometimes breaking its own user agreement, and that regulators in Seychelles, Hong Kong and Japan have found it working without a licence. The Treasury's release speaks of "severe deficiencies" in its anti-money-laundering controls. FinCEN accepts that MEXC publicly claims to have such controls, and judges them insufficient. MEXC said on 20 October 2026, 17 days before the order, that it was ending services for users in Russia and Belarus.

MEXC's answer

MEXC's reply came on X at 00:02 UTC on 7 November. It said it was aware of the order and reviewing it with its legal and compliance teams. It said it takes the concerns seriously and intends to "engage constructively" with FinCEN and other regulators. It has begun an independent review of its anti-money-laundering and sanctions controls, and promised further updates. It did not address FinCEN's figures.

Its chief executive, Vugar Usi, posted at 04:28 UTC that "misconceptions" were spreading. He said the order "only restricts certain fund transfers" between MEXC and US financial institutions, that it "does not freeze or seize any assets held on MEXC", and that users can trade normally. He said the company is cooperating with the authorities and that he has "full confidence" the matter will be resolved. Both posts were the latest found in a check of MEXC's accounts at 05:41 UTC on 7 November.

What it means for ordinary MEXC users

The order names no customers and contains no instruction to freeze accounts. Whether funds are safe is MEXC's claim, and neither the order nor the Treasury's release speaks to it.

MEXC's own terms list the United States among its prohibited jurisdictions, along with Britain, Canada and France, among others. Once the ban starts, a US bank or US crypto firm could not send funds to MEXC or receive funds from it. FinCEN accepts that crypto firms often cannot refuse an incoming transfer, and says firms may use discretion in some cases, such as coins that left MEXC and sat for a long time in a private wallet.

For customers elsewhere, FinCEN assumes "a portion" of MEXC's business is legitimate but says it lacks full insight into how much. It says that business is outweighed by the risks, and that lawful users "could readily find alternatives". The order does not say what happens to a customer's own transfer that touches a US firm.

The aftermath

The next step is publication in the Federal Register, which starts the 30-day clock. Until the ban begins, US firms are not barred by this order, though sanctions rules and suspicious-activity reporting duties apply to them as before. The order has no end date.

MEXC has said it will talk to FinCEN and had not said by 7 November whether it will challenge the order in court. It has not published results from its independent review, or said who is carrying it out. FinCEN holds the power to grant exemptions and grants none in the posted text. As of 7 November no court had ruled on FinCEN's findings, and no criminal charge against MEXC had been reported.

The order is part of what the Treasury calls Operation Economic Outcast, the name on its 1 October 2026 release sanctioning the A7 Network. The MEXC release also reminds whistleblowers that they may earn awards if their information leads to penalties above $1,000,000.

What this teaches

  • A FinCEN order is not an OFAC sanction. This one bars US firms from transfers with one named exchange and blocks no property.
  • A finding of "reasonable grounds" by an agency is not a court verdict, and the money it counts is not money the company is said to have kept.
  • Totals for illicit flows depend on definitions. "Direct and indirect exposure" is a wider net than direct dealing with a sanctioned party.
  • One story can carry several true Iran figures. The size depends on whether the count is all exposure, direct dealing with exchanges, or state bodies alone.
  • Effective dates matter: this ban starts 30 days after publication, not on the day of the headline.