Hack Database

Web3Auth: Company Says It Moved $5.6M Out of Keplr Wallets Ahead of a Thief, and the Flaw Was Its Own

Web3Auth, owned by Consensys, says its own flaw exposed Keplr users' keys and that it moved $5.6M to 12 safe addresses first. The theft total is unknown.

Web3Auth, the login provider owned by Consensys.

Key numbers

  • $5.6M

    Moved to safety

  • ~$6M

    Bitquery estimate (disputed)

  • 44,000+

    Wallets in that estimate

  • Not disclosed

    Confirmed loss

By early on Sunday 8 November 2026, twelve crypto addresses published by a company called Web3Auth held about $5.6 million that had belonged to ordinary users of the Keplr wallet. Those users had not sent it there. Web3Auth had, and it says it did so to keep the money away from a thief.

That makes this a different kind of story from the one CMZ reported on 7 November. Then, Keplr (a wallet app for the Cosmos family of blockchains, built by Chainapsis) and Web3Auth (a company that lets apps offer wallets behind a Google or Apple login) had paused sign-in after users reported transfers they never approved, and neither would say why. Now Web3Auth, which Consensys (the company behind the MetaMask wallet) bought in June 2025, says a flaw in its own systems exposed the secret keys of some Keplr users who signed in with Google or Apple.

Two numbers that are not the same

The $5.6 million is money that was moved to safety. It is not a loss. The figure comes from The Block, which checked the balances of the 12 recovery addresses on the blockchain, and it describes what sat in those addresses on 8 November, not what an attacker took.

The estimate of a theft comes from Bitquery, a blockchain data firm. It reported on 7 November that a thief had collected about $6 million from more than 44,000 Keplr wallets. In more detail, Bitquery counted 44,041 affected addresses across seven Cosmos chains and another 7,603 on Injective, about 44,700 distinct wallets once overlaps were removed. It put the transfers it tracked at $6.01 million.

The two numbers collide. All eight addresses Bitquery tied to the thief appear on Web3Auth's list of recovery addresses. In other words, much of what looked like theft on the blockchain may have been Web3Auth's own rescue. Web3Auth has called the $6.01 million theft figure wrong, and said some of the movements Bitquery flagged were protective transfers that looked like attacks. Keplr called the listed addresses "recovery addresses rather than malicious wallets". Neither company has said how much the original attacker took, and the two figures cannot simply be added or subtracted. Bitquery's number stays an outside estimate, and the real loss is unknown.

The locksmith and the safe

Web3Auth's account is easiest to follow as a locksmith who learns that copies of a set of safe keys have leaked. He cannot tell the owners in time, and a burglar is already working through the street. So he uses the leaked keys himself, empties the safes he can reach into a vault he controls, and posts the vault's address.

According to Web3Auth, that is what happened. Its recovery team swept wallets the attacker had not yet reached, using what it called "the same path of the original attacker". Web3Auth said funds recovered this way "are safe", and that it is "working with Keplr on a path to recovery for users".

The rescue worked on money that was parked as well as money that was free. Most of the funds are on the Cosmos Hub, in about 2.49 million ATOM, worth roughly $3.3 million, much of it staked. Staking is locking coins to earn interest, like a fixed-term deposit that normally takes 21 days to get out. The sweeps turned that locked money into ordinary tokens at once, bypassing the 21-day wait. Bitquery separately counted about 1.96 million staked ATOM moved this way. Web3Auth's list covers addresses on 11 Cosmos-based networks, including Osmosis, Celestia, Akash, Noble, Injective, dYdX, Babylon, Axelar, Saga and Agoric, plus one shared address for eight EVM chains, the family of networks that includes Ethereum. Web3Auth says it will add more addresses as it verifies them.

Rescue without asking

There is an awkward side to the story. A third company moved customers' money without being asked. The owners of those wallets did not approve the transfers, and from the outside they looked identical to the theft. Web3Auth admitted as much: "We are aware that some of these transactions have been mistaken for attacker activity." Keplr warned that some accounts "may already show a reduced or empty balance as a result of these mitigation efforts".

CMZ found no published complaint from a user about the rescue, and none from a regulator. The coverage read for this article reports none. That may only reflect how new the story is. Open questions remain: whether every wallet that was swept was actually exposed, how Web3Auth chose which wallets to move, and what authority it claims to have over keys that Keplr describes as belonging to the user. The ownership is also unusual. The company that says it is holding people's money safely is the same company whose flaw, by its own account, put the money at risk.

What Keplr says, and what it changed

Josh Lee, a co-founder of Chainapsis, said: "This was not a hack of Keplr's code. The incident originated at Web3Auth, a provider Keplr uses." He estimated that about 20% of Keplr's Google and Apple login accounts were affected, then said only a fraction of those seemed to have been exploited and that the rest may be recoverable. Keplr says accounts made with a recovery phrase or a hardware wallet were not affected. Web3Auth says it has found no evidence that MetaMask users were affected.

Two things have changed from the 7 November report. First, a cause is now on the record: Web3Auth says a flaw in its own systems exposed the keys, although neither company has published a technical explanation of the flaw. Second, Keplr's advice has changed. On 7 November it told users not to deposit new funds and did not tell them to move money out. Keplr now tells Google and Apple login users to move remaining liquid assets to a wallet secured by a recovery phrase or a hardware device, and not to send more money to the old account.

Have users been repaid

On the evidence available on 9 November, no user has been reported as getting money back, and nobody has published a way to claim it. Web3Auth and Keplr say they are working on a path to recovery and on a way for users to check whether their account was affected. FinanceFeeds reported that neither company had published a claims procedure, a schedule or a compensation commitment. Keplr has not confirmed that affected users will be reimbursed.

Both companies warn that scammers pose as helpers in the days after an incident. Users are told to ignore messages, links or direct messages offering recovery, and to trust only Keplr's and Web3Auth's official channels.

The aftermath

As of 9 November 2026, the $5.6 million sat in 12 Web3Auth recovery addresses. Google and Apple login on Keplr and Web3Auth's embedded wallet service remained paused. Neither company has published how much the original attacker took, how many accounts lost money for good, a technical cause, a claims process or a reimbursement plan. Web3Auth says the rescued funds are safe and that it is working with Keplr on returning them.

What this teaches

  • A figure of money moved to safety is not a loss figure, and an on-chain theft estimate can include the rescue.
  • A rescue can look identical to a theft on the blockchain, so outside estimates built from transfers need caution.
  • Social login hands part of the key to a company in the middle, and a flaw there can reach every app that company serves.
  • Wallets made with a recovery phrase or a hardware device were reported unaffected.
  • Messages offering to recover funds are a second wave of fraud, and only official channels count.