Hack Database

Initia: A Second Hack in 18 Days Took $615K Through Faked Bridge Transfers

Initia halted its chain again on 10 November after about $615K left through transfers faked with stolen keys, 18 days after its first hack.

Initia halted its chain for the second time in 18 days.

Key numbers

  • ~$3.27M

    Taken (revised by Initia)

  • $605K USDC + $10K

    Left via Noble

  • 18

    Days since first hack

  • Nov 10, 06:18 UTC

    Chain halted

At 06:18 UTC on Tuesday 10 November 2026, Initia stopped its blockchain for the second time in under three weeks. A blockchain halt works like a stock exchange suspending trading: nothing moves until the operators switch it back on. Initia said it acted together with its validators, the independent operators who keep the network running, after finding that money had been taken out of locked accounts that should have been untouchable.

The company's preliminary figure is about $605,000 in USDC, a digital dollar issued by the American company Circle, plus about $10,000 in other tokens, all of which left through Noble, a separate blockchain best known as a gateway for USDC. The tracker SlowMist lists the loss as $615,000. The security firm CertiK counted about $636,000 in suspicious outflows over 16 successful transfers to Noble, according to crypto.news. Neither number is final. Initia says most of the rest of what was moved out of the locked accounts is still sitting on its own halted chain.

The first hack, on 23 October, was a flaw in the software engine that runs Initia, which printed fake money and let one wallet cash out about $2.7 million. CMZ told that story in "Initia: A Hidden Bug Printed $2M of Fake Dollars, and $2.7M Got Away". This one is different. Initia's account this time is not a software flaw but stolen keys.

What Initia says happened

Initia is a "layer 1", a main blockchain, with smaller networks called rollups attached to it. A rollup is a branch office: an app runs its own small chain and settles its books with the head office. Money moving between the main chain and a rollup does not physically travel. It is locked in an escrow account on the main chain, much like a deposit held by a notary, and an equivalent amount appears on the other side. The messages that tell the notary to release a deposit travel over IBC, short for Inter-Blockchain Communication, a standard way for connected blockchains to pass instructions and payments to one another.

According to Initia's post on X at 07:07 UTC, the "transfers were made using compromised rollup infrastructure keys allowing an attacker to fabricate IBC transfers." In plain terms, the attacker obtained the digital keys that a rollup's operators use to prove their instructions are genuine, and used them to send the main chain forged release orders. The notary checked the signature, found it valid and handed over the deposits. The signatures were real. The people holding them were not the rollup's operators.

Initia's account is a statement from the company itself and has not been verified by an outside investigator. SlowMist, which keeps a public log of hacks, files the incident under "Private Key Leak", which matches the company's description. Initia has not said how the keys were obtained, which rollups were affected, or whether the stolen keys belonged to infrastructure that Initia runs or to separate teams that run their own rollups.

Warning signs the day before

The trouble was visible about 11 hours before the halt. At 19:30 UTC on 9 November Initia posted that its team was "investigating an issue affecting rollup infrastructure" and had coordinated with the rollups to pause temporarily. It added: "We have not identified any impact to user funds." The main chain stayed up, though some services, including its block explorer Initia Scan, ran slowly.

That sentence did not hold. The next morning Initia found the unauthorized transfers out of the escrow accounts and stopped the main chain as well. Initia has not said when it found the missing money, how long the transfers took, or why the rollup pause was not linked to a theft at the time.

Eighteen days after the first one

Between the two attacks, Initia had put the first hack behind it. According to crypto.news, the project patched the engine and resumed operations on 2 November. On 28 October the Initia Foundation, its non-profit backer, had approved funding to restore the one-to-one backing of the assets affected by the first hack, with ceilings of up to 1.08 million USDC, 105 ether and 1.4 million AUSD0, subject to audits and reconciliation of the final loss, as reported by Phemex.

So the chain had been running again for eight days when the second hit landed. Counting both attacks, Initia's own early figures added up to roughly $3.3 million taken in 18 days. Initia later revised the second attack alone to about $3.27 million (see the update below). That is a small sum next to the year's biggest thefts. It is a larger problem for a young chain whose token, INIT, was worth about $0.2057 on 10 November, with a market value of about $46 million, according to CoinGecko figures cited by crypto.news.

The strange part is the price. INIT rose about 61% in the 24 hours around the halt, from about $0.12 to above $0.23 at the peak, on trading volume of about $85 million, crypto.news reported. Initia has not commented on the rise, and no source consulted explains it.

Who is left holding the loss

The escrow accounts held assets that users had sent from the main chain to several rollups. The missing money is therefore someone's deposits, not Initia's own treasury. Initia has not announced whether affected users will be repaid, who would pay, or when block production will restart. It has not named a suspect, offered a bounty or said whether any of the $605,000 that reached Noble can be traced or frozen. USDC is issued by Circle, which can blacklist an address, as a bank can freeze an account, but nothing public says it has done so here.

The last official word is the one from 7:07 UTC on 10 November: the chain is halted, the company is working with security teams, validators and exchanges, and users should be careful with unofficial links, messages or claims. Anyone who held assets on a rollup connected to Initia is waiting for the same answer: whether the money is still there.

Bar chart: about $2.7 million taken on 23 October, about $615,000 on 10 NovemberChart: CMZ, from Initia and SlowMist figures
Money taken in the two Initia attacks.

The aftermath

As of the morning of 10 November 2026, Initia's main chain was halted and no restart date had been given. Initia had not said how the rollup keys were obtained, which rollups were affected, how much of the money can be recovered or whether depositors will be repaid. The figures differ by source: Initia says about $605,000 in USDC plus about $10,000 in other tokens, SlowMist lists $615,000 and CertiK counted about $636,000 in suspicious outflows over 16 transfers.

The first hack, on 23 October, is still being paid for. The Initia Foundation's funding plan for the assets affected by it was approved on 28 October, with ceilings set by the original losses, subject to audits and a final count. Whether the same cover will be extended to the second attack has not been said.

CMZ will update this story if Initia publishes a post-mortem, names the rollups concerned or announces a restart or repayment plan.

Update, 12 November 2026: Later on 10 November, Initia revised the size of this second attack to about $3.27 million of assets moved by the attacker, of which $2.16 million is frozen on its halted chain, up from the roughly $605,000 to $636,000 first reported. Initia also said the attacker got in through a compromised Google Cloud key and promised to restore affected assets in full. The full update is in the story "Initia: The Second Hack Was $3.27M, Not $615K, and a Stolen Google Cloud Key Was the Way In".

What this teaches

  • A patch for one flaw does not protect against a different one. Initia fixed its engine and restarted on 2 November, and the next attack came through stolen keys instead.
  • A signature proves only that a key was used, not who used it. Whoever holds the keys of a rollup can send the main chain orders that look genuine.
  • A chain is only as safe as the weakest operator connected to it. Initia's main chain was not the part that failed; the keys of the smaller networks attached to it were.
  • An early all-clear can be wrong. Initia's 9 November post saw no impact on user funds, and the escrow accounts were found short the next morning.
  • Locking deposits in escrow concentrates risk. One set of stolen keys reached assets bridged to several rollups at once.