Initia: The Second Hack Was $3.27M, Not $615K, and a Stolen Google Cloud Key Was the Way In
Initia now says the attacker moved about $3.27M, over five times its first figure, after stealing a cloud key. About $6M in under three weeks.
Key numbers
~$3.27M
Moved by attacker
$2.16M
Still frozen on chain
~$6M
Both hacks combined
~$615K
First reported figure
Later on 10 November 2026, Initia, a blockchain that had just been halted for the second time in 18 days, published its own account of what went wrong. The number in it was far bigger than anything reported that morning. About $3.27 million of assets were moved by the attacker, Initia said. The first figures, from Initia itself, the security tracker SlowMist and the firm CertiK, had been between about $605,000 and $636,000.
The company also said how the attacker got in. According to Initia, the way in was a stolen key for Google Cloud, the rented computer service that Initia used to run part of its network, and everything else followed from that. CMZ reported the early version in "Initia: A Second Hack in 18 Days Took $615K Through Faked Bridge Transfers". This is the update.
The new figure and why the first ones were lower
Initia's post on X at 16:43 UTC on 10 November, about ten hours after its first statement, says "around $3.27m of assets were moved to the attacker's Initia L1 address". Of that, "$2.16m of the stolen funds" remain "on the paused L1 where they cannot be moved". The rest left the chain. The attacker, Initia said, sold stolen assets on the Initia DEX, the chain's built-in trading venue, and then withdrew 13,400 TIA, 8,000 USDC.inj and 597,000 Noble USDC, "reaching Initia's outbound IBC rate limits". Those are caps on how much can leave the chain in a given time. No INIT, the chain's own token, was withdrawn.
The first reports counted only the money that had visibly left. Initia's morning post spoke of about $605,000 in USDC, a digital dollar issued by the American company Circle, and about $10,000 in other tokens, all sent out through Noble, a blockchain used as a gateway for USDC. The new post lists 597,000 Noble USDC and 8,000 USDC.inj, a USDC variant on Initia. Those two add up to $605,000, the same figure as before. So the early number matches the cash that had gone out, and the new one adds the stolen assets still inside the chain when it was stopped. It is the difference between counting the till takings and counting the stock taken off the shelves.
One gap remains. Initia's figures imply that about $1.1 million left the chain (3.27 minus 2.16), more than the roughly $615,000 first counted, and the company has not said what accounts for the difference. It has also not given dollar values for the 13,400 TIA, the token of the Celestia network.
What Initia says happened, step by step
The account is Initia's own, based on "our investigation so far". It has not been checked by an outside investigator, and Initia has not published a full post-mortem, the formal write-up that follows a security failure. The sequence it gives is this.
First, on 9 November, an attacker got into Initia's systems "through a command injection attack with a compromised GCP key used for provisioning private nodes". GCP stands for Google Cloud Platform. A command injection attack is a trick in which the attacker feeds a program text that it then runs as an order, as if a stranger's note slipped into a pile of paperwork were treated as the boss's instruction. A key is a credential, a kind of digital pass. Initia says only that it was a compromised key used to set up private nodes, the computers that run parts of the network. It has not said what type of key it was, how the attacker obtained it, or what went wrong on its side. Nothing in Initia's statement or in the reports blames Google, and Google has not been accused of any fault.
Second, the break-in exposed "environment variables", the settings stored on a server, which can contain passwords. These let the attacker into Initia's GitHub, where the company keeps its code, and into its Google Cloud accounts, and to "obtain further credentials".
Third, with those credentials the attacker reached Anvil, the hosting platform that rollups on Initia use. A rollup is a smaller blockchain attached to the main one, like a branch office to a head office. Through Anvil, the attacker could "validate forged IBC withdrawals from five rollups". IBC, short for Inter-Blockchain Communication, is the messaging standard chains use to pass instructions and money to each other. Assets sent from the main chain to a rollup are locked in an escrow account, like a deposit with a notary, and the forged withdrawal orders told the notary to release them.
This is the same mechanism Initia described in the morning, with a clearer starting point. The earlier phrase "compromised rollup infrastructure keys" and the new account fit together: the keys were reachable because someone first got into the cloud account.
The three days
The first sign came at 19:30 UTC on 9 November, when Initia said it was investigating "an issue affecting rollup infrastructure" and saw no impact on user funds. At 06:18 UTC on 10 November it halted the main chain with its validators, the independent operators who keep the network running. At 07:07 it blamed compromised keys. At 16:43 it published the Google Cloud account and the $3.27 million figure. Cointelegraph reported the new total on 11 November.
Repayment and restart
Initia says it "intends to restore the backing of affected assets in full" and is finalising a plan that it will share once confirmed. In plain terms, it promises to make users whole, though it has not said who will pay, how much, or when. Cointelegraph reports that recovery work is under way with law enforcement and security partners. Initia has named no suspect and has not said whether it will offer a bounty.
There is no date for a restart. Initia says it is "rebuilding the affected infrastructure from scratch in an isolated environment", with "least-privilege access controls", meaning each person or program gets only the access it strictly needs. It expects this to be "longer than a routine network restart" and will share timelines "as they become available".
About six million dollars in under three weeks
Adding Initia's two figures gives the scale. The first hack, on 23 October, took about $2.7 million, through a flaw in the software engine that let one wallet print fake money. The second took about $3.27 million. Together, 2.7 plus 3.27 equals 5.97, or about $6 million in 18 days. That is the total of the amounts moved, not the amount lost for good: $2.16 million of the second sum is frozen on Initia's own chain.
The first hack is being covered by a Foundation fund approved on 28 October, with ceilings of up to 1.08 million USDC, 105 ether and 1.4 million AUSD0. Whether the second gets the same treatment is the question the promise to restore backing is meant to answer.

The aftermath
As of 12 November 2026, Initia's main chain remains halted with no restart date. The company is rebuilding the affected systems from scratch and has promised to restore the backing of affected assets in full, but has not published the plan, a post-mortem or a suspect. About $2.16 million of the stolen assets is frozen on the halted chain.
CMZ will update this story if Initia publishes its repayment plan, the post-mortem or a restart date.
What this teaches
- The first loss figure is often the money that left, not the money taken. Initia's early $615K counted the cash that had gone out; the $3.27M adds the stolen assets still inside the chain.
- A chain's weakest point can be the company's own cloud account. The route here was one stolen key for setting up servers, not a flaw in the blockchain's code.
- One key can open many doors. A key for private nodes led to environment variables, then GitHub and cloud accounts, then the rollup hosting platform.
- Rate limits on withdrawals work. Initia says the attacker hit its outbound limits, which is why $2.16M did not leave.
- Two hacks in under three weeks through two different routes show that patching one hole says nothing about the next.
